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Chapter 2 
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Introduction to the scenarios
What are some of the possible futures for Barents Sea oil and gas? This chap-
ter draws upon the key trends and issues covered by the book’s thematic chap-
ters and presents three scenarios on the prospects for Norwegian–Russian 
cooperation in the Barents Sea. Ultimately human interaction will play a large 
part in how the Barents Sea is developed, and we have therefore given the sce-
narios metaphorical titles related to interaction between people.
In the first scenario – called “After You, Sir” – petroleum development in the 
Barents Sea region is a respectful and cooperative enterprise between Norway 
and Russia. However, both countries are also hesitant to make first moves on 
investments, because growing production of unconventional resources has sup-
pressed oil and gas prices. Thus we think of Norway and Russia as two British 
gentlemen in front of a door, each politely ushering the other to enter first, but 
neither of them actually going through the door:
“After you, Sir.”
“No, no, after you, Sir.”
In contrast, the second scenario – “Parallel Play, Not Only for Children” – is 
centered on the combination of high oil and gas prices and noncooperative 
relations between Norway and Russia in times of growing energy demand and 
oil/gas prices. The result is “parallel play”, a term borrowed from the pedagogi-
cal literature to describe the stage at which toddlers take an interest in playing 
with other children, but are incapable of interacting directly with them because 
of their limited social and language skills.
The third scenario – “Let’s Dance, but Where Is the Music?” – envisages a 
future where Russia and Norway cooperate on the development of a few big 
petroleum projects, but broader development is hindered by a strict and effec-
tive global climate regime that reduces profits from the sale of oil and gas and 
makes smaller Arctic fields commercially unviable.
Figure 2.1 plots the three scenarios on the 12 main uncertainties we have 
identified. The shape of each scenario on the radar diagram can be thought of 
as its unique fingerprint.
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Approach
In developing the scenarios we have applied the time-honored approach made 
famous by Royal Dutch Shell (Cornelius, Van de Putte, & Romani, 2005; Jef-
ferson, 2012; Varum & Melo, 2010). Rather than probability – which cannot 
be quantitatively estimated with any degree of accuracy for complex future 
developments – the criteria for the scenarios are instead plausibility and internal 
coherence. That means that the scenarios are not attempts at forecasting or pro-
jection but rather at identifying alternative possible developments, emphasizing 
the unpredictable interaction between multiple factors. The aim is not to predict 
the future but to prepare mentally for a full range of possible futures. Neither is 
it decisive whether the reader agrees with the scenarios or not, as long as he or 
she is stimulated to make his or her own reflections on the future.
The scenarios were developed through four stages. First, the book’s thematic 
chapters (3–14) were written to provide input on different topics of relevance 
for the future development of the oil and gas resources in the Barents Sea. In 
addition to the chapters as they are published here, the authors of each chap-
ter were requested to provide specific written input for the scenarios. Second, 
we held a series of internal intensive scenario-building discussions among the 
six authors of the scenarios. The authors include both Norwegians and Rus-
sians, and social scientists, natural scientists, and experts on technology, mak-
ing for rich and dynamic discussions. Third, the scenarios were presented at 
two dedicated seminars, one in Norway and one in Russia. The participants in 
these seminars were well-informed non-academic actors who are involved in 
petroleum cooperation between Norway and Russia. These sessions were also 
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Figure 2.1  Scenario star with all three scenarios
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interactive, with ample room for feedback and discussion. Fourth and finally, 
the written scenarios were submitted to three knowledgeable people for review.
In developing the scenarios we first identified developments that we believe 
are likely. These we refer to as “assumptions”, not because it is certain that they 
will take place but because we think they are significantly more probable than 
many other developments. An example is rising energy demand. Having laid 
out our assumptions, we attempted to identify key uncertainties – develop-
ments that we think are fundamentally uncertain and could easily tip one way 
or the other. An example is the future price of gas. Subsequently, we pieced 
together the three scenarios, each consisting of contrasting combinations of the 
assumptions and uncertainties.
Finally, we added a series of wild cards. These are events that have low probabil-
ity but would have a great impact. They are difficult to fit into the scenarios and 
are more like miniature scenarios in their own right. We believe that wild cards 
are one of the most important components in scenario building, because they 
help expose the full range of possible future developments. Unexpected things 
often do happen and play an important role in how the world develops. To pre-
pare for the future one therefore needs to prepare for the unexpected, and wild 
cards are a good way of remaining attuned to the future’s unforeseeable nature.
Assumptions
In this section, we briefly outline the main assumptions identified in the book’s 
thematic chapters and taken into the scenarios. By “assumptions” we mean 
things that we are reasonably confident about and therefore choose to treat as 
givens. This does not mean that they are guaranteed, just that we see them as 
significantly more probable than other factors we have considered.
Global markets vs. international political bodies
According to Chapter 3 (Overland, Simonia, Vasiliev, and Wilson Rowe), the 
Arctic, and especially the Barents Sea, is unlikely to be the setting for a major 
geopolitical conflict, and circumpolar political bodies are unlikely to propose 
binding agreements that would restrict oil and gas development. The Arctic 
Council is an important institution of political discussions but has no power 
over the Arctic nation-states and lacks power of enforcement. Also UN organi-
zations cannot stop Norwegian and Russian Arctic offshore petroleum activi-
ties. For the development of the Barents Sea, we therefore assume that the 
global market and global geopolitical context will be more important than 
circumpolar or other international political bodies.
Demand for energy
According to major world energy market forecasts, including those of the IEA 
and OPEC reviewed in Chapter 3 (Overland, Simonia, Vasiliev, and Wilson 
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Rowe), global energy demand is going to continue growing, driven by a com-
bination of population growth and economic growth. Forecasts also assume 
that oil and gas will remain an important part of the world energy supply, even 
if their consumption is reduced. The composition of the energy resources port-
folio to cover this increasing demand is, however, uncertain. For example, coal 
may or may not be phased out, and the balance between oil and gas is uncertain.
Asian market growth
We also assume that the importance of Asian markets will continue to grow and 
that Russia will continue diversifying its exports by expanding infrastructure to 
sell oil and gas to the Asia–Pacific region. Although we are relatively confident 
about this development and have therefore included it among our assumptions, 
we are far from sure how far it will go and its extent is therefore included in 
the uncertainties listed below.
Global climate policy
Although we do not know whether an effective new climate agreement will be 
reached to follow up and improve on the Kyoto Protocol, we do assume that 
climate change will remain on the political agenda. The pressure for transfor-
mation towards a low carbon economy comes from many directions. The UN 
report Better Growth, Better Climate (Global Commission on the Economy and 
Climate [GCEC], 2014) focuses on how major economies through innova-
tion and changing regulations can combine continued economic growth with 
reduced carbon emissions. The question is how quickly such policies will be 
developed and what impact they will have on the development and use of oil 
and gas resources.
Barents petroleum exploration
Exploration drilling will be extended to cover all parts of the southern Nor-
wegian Barents Sea. On the Russian side, the Dolginskoye, Varandey-More, 
Medin-More, and Pomorskoye fields will be explored (see Figure 9.4 in Chap-
ter 9 – Zolotukhin, Sungurov, and Streletskaya). However, outside the poten-
tially interesting structures that have already been identified for test drilling, very 
large fields are not very likely to be found, especially on the Norwegian side.
Arctic petroleum production
Oil and gas resources in the Arctic will continue to be explored and developed. 
Even though many environmentalists and fishermen are critical regarding Arc-
tic petroleum developments, exploration and production have already started 
and further development of new licenses is probable. Probably, the Dolginskoye 
oilfield will come into the production phase between 2015 and 2025. It is 
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therefore likely that there will be significant oil and gas production from the 
Arctic, although how much will be produced remains uncertain.
The cost of operations, maintenance, and logistics will be higher than in other 
parts of the world due to the harsh climate and longer distances that infrastruc-
ture and human resources need to travel. Subsea processing factories can be 
hooked up to production centers located relatively far away (say 200 km), mak-
ing integrated area development possible (see Chapter 10 – Bulakh, Gudmes-
tad, and Zolotukhin).
Arctic marine bio-resources
Although biodiversity and catches may be influenced downwards or upwards 
by climate change, the Barents Sea will remain an important marine habitat 
for Arctic marine species, both in terms of the planet’s ecology and in terms of 
commercial fisheries (see Chapter 13 – Kommedal, Bagi, and Hemmingsen).
Arctic weather conditions
Regardless of how the climate changes, Arctic weather conditions will chal-
lenge personnel and hardware (see Chapter 11 – Markeset, Sæland, Gudmestad, 
and Barabady). Greater physical and mental pressure on personnel will neces-
sitate higher wages and more time off. For hardware, there will be higher failure 
rates as well as higher maintenance costs also when there are no failures (see 
example Chapter 14 – Sundsbø). The cost of petroleum exploration and pro-
duction under these conditions will remain high, even if significant technologi-
cal progress is made and the climate heats up.
Northern Sea Route
The Northern Sea Route will remain secondary as a transport route for oil 
and gas from the Barents Sea to Asia. It will only be used in summer. Less ice 
may actually be more difficult to handle than a firm ice cover that it is pos-
sible to plow a channel through. There will be a limited number of icebreak-
ers, and they will have the capacity to take a limited number of ships in each 
convoy because the broken ice slips back into the channel they have created. 
This is disadvantageous for the development of the Barents Sea because it limits 
the volume of hydrocarbon resources that can be exported via the Northern 
Sea Route to Asia and therefore reduces possible synergies that the petroleum 
industry in the region can have by building and using a common infrastructure 
with the Northern Sea Route.
Business-to-business cooperation
Norwegian and other Western oil companies will continue to want access to 
the Russian part of the Barents Sea; and Russian oil companies will want access 
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to the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea (see Chapter 5 – Bourmistrov, Borge 
Doornich, and Krivorotov). However, there will be limited room for small sup-
ply companies to play a role in the Barents Sea petroleum province, especially 
local small players and especially on the Russian side – except if there are very 
many large developments and the authorities make a special effort to facilitate 
their participation.
Uncertainties
Having presented the points that we are relatively sure about in the previous 
section, here we summarize the points that we see as most uncertain. When 
forecasting the future, the aim is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible. This 
is of course not the aim in a scenario project such as this one. Uncertainties are 
rather at the core of the project and actively cultivated in order to define the 
range of possible scenarios. The uncertainties discussed here are also presented 
visually in Figure 2.1.
Price of gas and oil
As discussed in Chapter 3 – Overland, Simonia, Vasiliev, and Wilson Rowe – 
some of the uncertainties that will affect the development the Barents Sea are 
related to energy demand: will the prices of oil and gas rise, stabilize, or fall, 
and will they be high enough to justify the development of Barents Sea fields? 
Historically, the prices of oil and gas were tightly correlated, in large part due 
to the linking of gas contracts to oil prices. However, from 2005 to 2015, the 
prices of oil and gas increasingly diverged, as increasing amounts of gas were 
traded in spot markets and shale gas in the US pressed gas prices downwards. 
Thus, in our work on the uncertainties, we treated the future price of oil 
and future price of gas as two separate factors. This does not mean that they 
will not interact with each other, just that they will not necessarily move in 
tandem.
Asian growth
Although oil, and increasingly gas, is traded in global markets, location still 
makes some difference. As the Barents Sea is located as far away as it is pos-
sible to get from the Asia–Pacific region, it makes some difference whether 
demand for oil and gas imports will be concentrated in the Atlantic basin area 
or Asia. The effect of Asian growth on the development of the Barents Sea is 
nonetheless uncertain. Currently, import growth is concentrated in Asia, but if 
there is a slowdown in China’s growth, Asia’s importance may diminish (which 
might be positive for the Barents Sea) at the same time as oil prices would fall 
(which would be negative for the Barents Sea). On the other hand, if growth 
continues unabated in China, it could have a converse double effect on the 
Barents Sea: on the one hand it would help support higher oil and gas prices, 
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which would promote the development of the Barents Sea; on the other hand 
it would continue to drive Russian prioritization of its eastern provinces. Thus, 
the total impact of this double effect on the development of the Barents Sea is 
an important uncertainty.
Unconventionals outside the US
Another key question is whether the rapid development of unconventional oil 
and gas will spread beyond the United States, and how expensive unconven-
tionals will be. If they are cheap enough, they will be prioritized over Arctic 
resources, as they are less risky and available to more countries. Even if uncon-
ventionals stall, will there be room for large volumes of Barents Sea gas in the 
EU market, given the growing EU imports of LNG from Qatar and other 
countries, possible LNG deliveries from the US, coupled with deliberate EU 
efforts to cut dependence on Russian energy? This is not only a market ques-
tion, but also a political one: will the EU show any serious interest in support-
ing developments in the Barents Sea, and would the support only apply to the 
Norwegian part of the sea (in an effort to reduce import dependency on Rus-
sia) or also extend to the Russian side (in an effort to maximize overall supply)?
Global climate policy
A focus on green growth policies during the decade 2015–2020 could result in 
a new set of incentives and mechanisms that simultaneously promote growth 
and reduce carbon emissions. However, there is uncertainty as to whether and 
how quickly governments can produce a common international agreement on 
those issues. Will there be a global, binding, and strict agreement to follow up 
the Kyoto Protocol, and what would its impact be on demand for oil and, espe-
cially, gas? Coal is an obvious priority target for such an agreement, oil could be, 
but its status is less clear, and natural gas even more so. A stricter climate regime 
might even end up promoting natural gas.
Moreover, how will global climate change affect climatic conditions for 
petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, especially north of Bjørnøya? Will there 
be less ice but more dispersed icebergs and storms? In spite of a long-term 
trend towards global warming, could there be shorter-term (e.g. 20-year) oscil-
lations that make the region colder?
Amount of oil and gas found
As we can see from Chapter 8 – Verba, Ivanov, and Zolotukhin – and Chap-
ter 9 – Zolotukhin, Sungurov, and Streletskaya – the Barents Sea has important 
hydrocarbon resource potential both in terms of oil and gas. The Fedynsky 
High prospect is being drilled by Norwegian and Russian companies, but the 
outcome is not known. If there is a major find, this may spearhead devel-
opments in the Barents Sea due to proximity to land and infrastructure in 
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Kirkenes. It may be important whether it is oil or gas that is found, depending 
on which is better priced in the market. Gas is also more difficult and expensive 
to transport long distances.
Development of Lofoten area and infrastructure
As explained in Chapter 6 – Overland and Krivorotov – the Lofoten Islands 
area in Norway can be an important factor in the development of petroleum 
fields in the Barents Sea by serving as the gas transportation infrastructure 
bridge between well-developed southern gas fields in the Norwegian Sea and 
prospective gas fields in the Barents Sea. If the Lofoten area is opened, the effect 
on the Barents Sea is still not certain. At first it might distract attention from the 
Barents Sea, but if major gas resources are found and the Norwegian pipeline 
grid is extended northwards to the Lofoten Islands, it could provide an impor-
tant bridge to the Barents Sea that could make many more natural gas projects 
there feasible in the long term.
As discussed in Chapter 3 – Overland, Simonia, Vasiliev, and Wilson Rowe – 
during the entire post-Soviet period, Gazprom has had a monopoly on exports, 
but there has been some discussion of unbundling the company and mov-
ing the control over exports to an independent government body. Novatek 
has already been permitted to export LNG from the Yamal Peninsula, but this 
is considered an exception from the rule that was only possible for LNG. If 
Gazprom loses the monopoly, it could open up the way for more dynamism in 
the Barents Sea, as other companies could handle the opportunities there more 
creatively. On the other hand, if Gazprom keeps the export monopoly, it may 
result in other companies being forced to produce more LNG if it is seen as 
easier to get exemptions from the monopoly for LNG than pipeline exports. 
Therefore, an important question is: will there be a gas pipeline to the European 
market in place providing access for Barents Sea gas to this market and facilitat-
ing further developments in the area? Related questions are: will this pipeline 
go through Norwegian waters or through the Republic of Karelia, and will the 
Norwegian and/or Russian governments reduce taxes in order to kick-start 
field developments and infrastructure?
Arctic petroleum technology development
As follows from Chapter 10 – Bulakh, Gudmestad, and Zolotukhin – another 
important uncertainty is how fast remote operation and subsea technologies 
will develop in the future. These technologies can lower the cost of field opera-
tion and be decisive for whether fields are sufficiently profitable to be brought 
online. For instance, will the Johan Castberg oilfield and nearby fields be devel-
oped together, creating enough infrastructure to spearhead other developments?
The technology to be developed should reflect growing environmental, pre-
paredness, and safety concerns related to expanding petroleum operations in 
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the Arctic (see Chapter 10 – Bulakh, Gudmestad, and Zolotukhin – Chapter 
11 – Markeset, Sæland, Gudmestad, and Barabady – and Chapter 12 – Njå and 
Gudmestad). For instance, the effect of hydrocarbon pollution on Arctic species 
and ecosystems and especially the effect of long-term exposure have not been 
researched thoroughly. Future research may show that it is worse or better than 
thought. It is also not clear whether environmental legislation will be devel-
oped adequately for the Arctic environment, and whether effective legislation 
will be adopted and upheld by Arctic states and operators. If environmental and 
safety demands are strict, they will push up the cost of petroleum projects. If 
they are not coordinated by Norway and Russia, they can create obstacles to 
cooperation and joint development (see Chapter 4 – Bambulyak, Golubeva, 
Sydnes, Sydnes, Larsen, and Streletskaya).
When there is another major oil spill somewhere in the world it could con-
tribute to holding back the development of the Barents Sea, especially if it is an 
Arctic offshore oil spill that looks bad on television. Spills that have occurred 
in the past, such as the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon accidents, have 
received broad media coverage but have, nonetheless, only briefly slowed down 
petroleum sector developments. The main route of influence for such an inci-
dent on the development of the Barents Sea would most likely be through a 
tightening of environmental regulations that drive up the need for new tech-
nology and thus the cost of field development.
Russian–Western relations
It will be difficult to build good Russian–Western relations during the 
first half of the decade from 2015–2025. Over time, the EU will attempt 
to steadily reduce energy imports from Russia. Although news fades fast 
and, for example, the conflict in South Ossetia was forgotten quite eas-
ily, the conflict in Ukraine has brought some serious negative components 
into Russian–Western relations and could turn the relationship into a 
self-reinforcing negative spiral.
Thus, due to the conflict over Ukraine, Western–Russian relations could 
potentially be bad for a long period of time, especially if Russia succeeds in 
reorienting its economic focus towards Asia and the EU reduces its economic 
dependence on Russia. At the same, there is also a possibility that the conflict 
over Ukraine will subside and relations improve. So the question is first, will 
Russian–Western relations improve or worsen, and, second, how will that affect 
Norwegian–Russian relations?
Understanding Russian–Western relations is particularly important because 
it will affect Russian attitudes towards the role of Western companies in the 
development of Russian Arctic offshore fields (see Chapter 5 – Bourmistrov, 
Borge Doornich, and Krivorotov). To what extent will Russia allow for direct 
foreign investment in developing its Arctic offshore fields, and how actively will 
Norwegian companies pursue these opportunities? What changes might there 
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be in elite attitudes in either country towards the other, due to a change of 
government or other political developments?
Norwegian–Russian relations
The relationship between Norway and Russia will never be entirely divorced 
from the broader Russian–Western relationship, but neither is it entirely 
dependent on it either (see Chapter 6 – Overland and Krivorotov). Countries 
other than Norway are more likely to be at the forefront of Western quarrels 
with Russia. In spite of asymmetries, it will be in the shared interest of both 
Russia and Norway, as the two countries sharing the Barents Sea, to cooperate 
in meeting common challenges, e.g. exploration and development, environ-
mental protection, resource management, and promoting regional growth and 
employment. However, the degree of cooperation depends on the approaches 
of both sides, as well as all the other contextual factors discussed here.
Although we do not expect Russia’s relationship with Norway to be one of 
its worst European relationships, there is a considerable range within which it 
can move. One of the great successes of Norwegian–Russian cooperation was 
the partial decentralization of the bilateral relationship to the local and regional 
level through the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. As Russian–Western relations 
have soured, there has been a de facto recentralization of Norwegian foreign 
policy towards Russia. A question for the future is therefore whether the prov-
inces near the Barents Sea will have the possibility to cooperate locally across 
the border and especially in the traditional areas of cooperation such as educa-
tion, research, and people-to-people (see Chapter 7 – Bourmistrov, Gudmestad, 
Salygin, and Zolotukhin). A related question is whether Norway will continue 
to have ambition to be a leading Arctic state focusing on Arctic oil and gas and 
relations with Russia in the North, or might an emphasis on climate change 
under a future Norwegian government alter Norway’s strategic priorities?
Extent of Russia’s orientation towards Asia
Giving the potential for Chinese–Russian petroleum cooperation described in 
Chapter 3 – Overland, Simonia, Vasiliev, and Wilson Rowe – if Russian–Western 
and Norwegian–Russian relations stay negative or worsen, Russia could diver-
sify and give Chinese companies an important role in the Barents Sea. This 
could affect the prospects for Norwegian–Russian cooperation. The relevant 
uncertainty in this respect is: will political relations between Russia and the 
West and the instability and risks that they bring deter Norwegian and Russian 
companies from investing in each other’s countries in the long term?
As noted in Chapter 9 – Zolotukhin, Sungurov, and Streletskaya – Rus-
sia is the world’s largest country by surface area and has many locations to 
choose between for hydrocarbon production. Thus Russia may prioritize the 
Barents Sea or other areas such as the Russian Far East, the Yamal Peninsula, or 
enhanced oil recovery from its old West Siberian fields.
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One strength of Norwegian–Russian cooperation is that previous coopera-
tive initiatives between the two countries are already close to institutionalization, 
particularly attempts to harmonize education (see Chapter 7 – Bourmistrov, 
Gudmestad, Salygin, and Zolotukhin) and some business practices (see Chap-
ter 5 – Bourmistrov, Borge Doornich, and Krivorotov). However, the extent to 
which Russia can shift towards Asia will also depend on how active and efficient 
the Norwegian and Russian authorities will be in promoting petroleum-related 
joint industrial investments in the coastal Barents Sea region: cross-border 
Russian–Norwegian business-to-business and people-to-people contacts (cre-
ating cooperative institutions, lifting administrative and cultural barriers, etc.).
Interaction between different uncertainties
The uncertainties identified in the previous section can be thought of as the 
building blocks for a time machine: how each of them works out and how they 
interact with each other will determine what the future looks like. Figure 2.2 
is a simplified illustration of how we have thought about this interaction. The 
darker an arrow, the more strongly we assume a factor influences another. Dot-
ted lines indicate that a factor reinforces the effect of another factor.
Scenarios
In line with Shell’s methodology, we have striven to avoid scenarios that are 
simply optimistic or pessimistic. Instead, each of them is meant to be balanced 
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Figure 2.2  Time machine – how the future may be shaped by the interaction of factors
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and multifaceted. We tried to avoid getting caught up in discussions of current 
events or simply extending current trends. That is always difficult. An informed 
observer can often make good predictions for the coming six or 12 months, and 
while we have worked on our scenarios we have experienced that some of our 
visions have already become true. Although that gives one the feeling that one 
is on the right track, it is not necessarily a good thing, as the scenarios should 
strive to relate to a future beyond what we know now. It is also worth noting 
that the diversity of the people involved in making the scenarios, while enrich-
ing and providing a sound basis for them, has also had a limiting effect as it 
was necessary to compromise between sometimes highly divergent worldviews. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide an overview of how the different assumptions and 
uncertainties are related to each other in the three scenarios.
Scenario 1: “After You, Sir”
– Good relations, but surging unconventionals reduce oil and gas prices
In the scenario “After You, Sir”, Russian–Western relations had not fully recov-
ered from the Ukrainian crisis, but the crisis did not have a similar degree of 
influence on the cooperation between the two states in the Arctic. Because 
of this, the relationship between Norway and Russia was respectful, and their 
interaction in the Barents Sea was cooperative. But the price of oil and, espe-
cially, natural gas, was low and combined with the high costs of infrastructure 
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Figure 2.3  Fingerprint of the scenario “After You, Sir”
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that meant that many fields were not commercially viable. Thus, in spite of the 
cooperative atmosphere, the two countries were like two British gentlemen in 
front of a door, each politely ushering the other to enter first, but neither of 
them actually going through the door.
A new climate regime was agreed upon in Paris in 2015, but it lacked teeth 
and failed to limit greenhouse gas emissions seriously. Unconventionals, espe-
cially shale gas, spread across the world as the Chinese, Argentineans, and others 
successfully copied the US approach, flooding the market with gas. The interest 
of companies in developing Arctic petroleum technology was consequently 
low. Even in Russia, unconventional natural gas became more interesting than 
the expensive Arctic offshore developments – especially as the Chinese came 
to fully master shale gas technology and not only used it to expand their own 
production but in parallel flooded the world market with cheap drilling rigs, 
often leased along with cheap, disciplined Chinese engineers.
In the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the Russian authorities and compa-
nies were slow to act, while Rosneft and Gazprom continued monopolizing 
all opportunities. On the Norwegian side, the authorities and Statoil disagreed 
on infrastructure choices and environmental principles, and the Lofoten Islands 
area remained closed for exploration. Both the Norwegian and Russian author-
ities were reluctant to give tax breaks. The 1.8 trillion-bcm trans-boundary 
gas field identified in the Fedynsky High in 2016 was developed jointly by 
Gazprom and Statoil and is due to come on stream in 2029. The gas would be 
piped through Russia to the EU and partly replace volumes from West Siberia 
that were being diverted to Russia’s Altai pipeline to western China.
A number of smaller oilfields were identified on the Norwegian side, whereas 
exploration stalled on the Russian side. But beyond Johan Castberg and Fedyn-
skoye fields, there were few actual field developments.
As there were not so many projects, the development of the local supply 
industry in North Norway and Russia was slow. Fields were mostly developed 
from the Norwegian side, where Kirkenes was used as a main supply hub. The 
volume of contracts had not been high enough to justify a high level of local 
content and therefore most of the contracts were awarded to internationally 
well-positioned Norwegian firms that used only a few local Russian subcon-
tractors, mostly those who had cooperated with Gazprom/Shtokman Develop-
ment AG previously.
Scenario 2: “Parallel Play, Not Only for Children” 
– Intensified but noncooperative development of the Barents Sea under 
conditions of rising energy demand and political polarization
In this scenario – “Parallel Play” – the market context for the development of 
the Barents Sea was good, especially because of continuous economic growth 
in Asia and correspondingly growing demand for energy. But the relationship 
between Norway and Russia was not so good, and the two countries both tried 
to go it on their own. The result was parallel play, a term borrowed from the 
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pedagogical literature, where it refers to the stage at which small children want 
to play but are unable to interact directly with each other.
In this scenario, no climate agreement had been reached. Unconventionals 
failed to spread significantly outside the US because other countries failed to 
adopt the legislation necessary to secure the property rights that were indis-
pensable for the success of unconventionals in the US. Especially the oil price, 
but also the gas price, was high, providing strong market support for field 
developments in the Barents Sea. But the Norwegian–Russian relationship had 
been drawn into the maelstrom of persistently worsening Russian–Western 
relations, and, beyond the regulation of cod stocks, there was little cooperation 
in the Barents Sea.
In 2022 there was a military confrontation off the coast of the Svalbard archi-
pelago over a fisheries incident. Although the violence was minor, it was not 
good for cooperation in the Barents Sea. As a result both sides were working 
actively but not in coordination, and Russian activity in the Barents Sea had 
been weakened by the intensive efforts to develop Far East and East Siberia as 
the country reoriented itself towards Asia.
It also turned out that the procedure for unitization of trans-boundary oil and 
gas fields under the 2010 Murmansk Treaty was not quite clear after all, and in 
the prevailing atmosphere the sides were unable to iron out the wrinkles. Com-
bined with the generally negative political atmosphere, this made it difficult to 
develop any trans-boundary fields. The major oil finds happened to straddle the 
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boundary delimitation line, meaning that little happened on the oil front. Some 
smaller fields deeper into the Norwegian part of the sea were however developed.
The Chinese company, CNPC, had taken a central role on the Russian side 
after it offered to take full responsibility for the Shtokman field in return for a 
49% stake and little security apart from assurances from Russia’s top politicians.
Norway’s conservative coalition government was reelected in 2017, with, 
among other things, a strong vote in North Norway based on a promise to 
finally open the Lofoten area for exploration. Although the pro-oil part of the 
North Norwegian population was dissatisfied with the government’s recent 
performance, the green turn of the competing coalition led by the Labor Party 
gave pro-oil voters little choice.
An unprecedented number of blocks were opened for exploration on the 
Norwegian side in 2018 and the industry grasped the opportunity and went 
on a hectic exploration campaign. On both sides, companies heavily invested in 
the development of Arctic petroleum technologies, but the lack of cooperation 
across the border limited progress on both sides as well as the potential market 
for new technologies. There were sufficient discoveries to extend the Nor-
wegian pipeline grid northwards to the Lofoten archipelago, but there were 
insufficient gas finds in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea to extend it any 
further, and the Chinese and Russian companies working in the Russian part 
of the Barents Sea opted for LNG instead, deploying a floating LNG plant to 
export the gas from the Shtokman field.
Supply industries on both the Norwegian and Russian sides had developed, 
aimed at delivering products and services to the fields in each country. On both 
the Norwegian and Russian sides, the volume of contracts awarded to the local 
supply industries had increased considerably because of the high volume of 
contracts awarded. However, local content policies motivated Chinese compa-
nies to work mainly with Russian partners, while the Norwegians worked with 
Western oil companies – there was little cooperation between Norwegian and 
Russian companies.
Scenario 3: “Let’s Dance, but Where Is the Music?”
– Good cooperation in the Barents Sea, but demand is hampered by 
climate policy
In the scenario “Let’s Dance”, Norway and Russia were keen to cooperate in 
the development of the Barents Sea, but the international market conditions 
were not conducive for investment.
Russian–Western relations were reasonably good and Norwegian–Russian 
relations were even better. Asian growth had stagnated, resulting in lower demand 
for energy. Consequently Russia had reduced its interests in Asia beyond keeping 
up deliveries of gas to China in accordance with the agreement on the Power of 
Siberia Pipeline reached in 2014. The Altai pipeline was only partially filled. The 
world had also become increasingly worried about climate change – and willing 
to do something about it. Both the Norwegian and Russian governments had 
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answered the call of the UN for green growth policies and implemented those. 
The Lofoten area was permanently closed for petroleum development, mainly 
due to local environmental concerns and fisheries interests.
At the global level, a serious follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol 
was finally agreed upon just before the extension of the Kyoto Protocol ran 
out in 2020. Strict measures were swiftly ratcheted up, putting downward pres-
sure on the price of oil. The price of natural gas was higher, as gas was used to 
replace coal, which had become prohibitively expensive under the new climate 
regime. This also put pressure on the development of unconventionals, espe-
cially shale oil.
The new climate regime was accompanied by much stricter environmen-
tal regulations and requirements for Arctic offshore petroleum operations in 
Norway and Russia. This put pressure on companies to advance their Arctic 
petroleum technologies. Due to the cooperative climate, the Russian and Nor-
wegian petroleum majors managed to develop new advanced technologies at 
a reasonable cost, due only to close research cooperation. However, the lack 
of development in the Lofoten area meant that there was no infrastructure 
to connect the Barents Sea with the rest of the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Instead, a pipeline was finally completed in 2025 to take Shtokman gas from 
Murmansk through Karelia to Vyborg, and Shtokman was to come on stream 
in 2026 – with the same consortium of companies as in the initial agreement: 
Gazprom, Statoil, and Total. However, apart from the Shtokman and Johan 
Castberg projects, there were few developments, especially oilfields, in the Bar-
ents Sea as demand was subdued by the new climate agreement. Faced with 
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limited capacity and uncertainty about the future of the petroleum industry in 
the High North, the local supply industry in both Norway and Russia had to 
make U-turns in their strategic priorities to answer the call for green growth 
policies. Most of the firms had chosen to diversify market portfolios and to 
develop and supply products and services for projects other than petroleum 
industrial ones, related to, for example, green cities, building wind turbines, etc. 
There were several interesting examples of how technological innovation had 
stimulated Norwegian and Russian companies to cooperate.
Wild cards
Wild cards are events that have low probability, but high impact if they do 
occur – similar to the concept of “black swans”. They are, thus, clustered in 
the top left corner of the graph in Figure 2.6. The fact that such unexpected 
events do happen all the time is one of the reasons for using Shell’s imaginative 
scenario-building methodology rather than forecasting and projecting trends.
Frequently – but not always – they are exogenous to the system and trends 
that underpin the main scenarios. Alternatively, they may arise when a trend 
reaches a threshold or tipping point (cf. Anker, Baev, Brunstad, Overland, & 
Torjesen, 2010, p. 131; Brunstad, Magnus, Swanson, Hønneland, & Overland, 
2004, p. 163). Wild cards are thus often stand-alone events that would throw 
other variables into the air and impact on many different trends. In that regard 
they are mini-scenarios in their own right, therefore standing alone rather than 
being integrated into the main scenarios.
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Figure 2.6  Wild cards in the development of petroleum resources in the Barents Sea
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In working on the wild cards for this book, it was noticeably difficult to think 
of unpredictable events that would lead to rapid petroleum development in the 
Barents Sea. Most events that we have managed to think of would reduce the 
likelihood of rapid petroleum development.
Wild card 1: a massive oil spill
We have considered an oil spill per se as only an uncertainty rather than a wild 
card, but a massive oil spill is a wild card, especially if it occurs somewhere in the 
Arctic. It is not certain how it would affect the oil and gas industry, as there have 
previously been big spills that did not lead to major changes in the industry in 
spite of broad media coverage and changes in regulations. However, changes in 
regulations could make fields more expensive to develop, and the Lofoten area 
is already closed (at least for the time being) due to environmental concerns, 
showing that such concerns can in fact have an impact.
For the development of the Barents Sea, the massive oil spill was the death knell. 
Oil had been the most attractive resource due to higher oil than gas prices, but, 
due to the costly new regulations, only very large oilfields could be developed.
Wild card 2: a big earthquake in the US blamed on fracking
A 2017 earthquake in Oklahoma City killed 12 people and brought down many 
buildings, as well as several railway and highway bridges. The event received 
television coverage around the world. It led to a temporary ban against frack-
ing near residential areas in the US and all-out bans on fracking in many other 
countries. The knock-on effect of this was that oil and gas prices rose, especially 
in the US, but gradually also in other parts of the world.
For the Barents Sea, this meant that the Shtokman project was revived, with 
a floating LNG terminal and aimed largely at the North American market.
Wild card 3: one of the major economies crashes
During the coming years, one of the world’s major economies may crash, with 
a major negative impact on the development of the petroleum resources in the 
Barents Sea. The economies we consider here are China, the EU, and the US.
China
Escalating tensions with Japan finally caused Japanese companies to start with-
drawing from China. Municipal and company debt reached unsustainable lev-
els, and, in a series of attempts to bring the situation under control, the real 
estate market unraveled at the same time as many municipal and corporate 
bonds matured. China had been on an upward spiral for a long time, now it was 
on a downward one and from 2018 to 2021 it went steeply downwards. This 
forced the Chinese to reduce their rapidly rising wage and other costs, which 
in turn led to (even) lower imports and to social unrest in China, which in 
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turn further undermined Chinese growth. The Chinese threw out their envi-
ronmental ambitions, stopped replacing coal with natural gas, and reduced oil 
imports. At the same time, the West was reducing its consumption of fossil fuels, 
both for economic and climate reasons. This brought oil and gas prices down, 
which in turn brought developments in the Barents Sea almost to a halt.
The United States
The US economy had been the first to overcome the financial crisis that started 
in 2008. However, the US recovery was driven by printing money, which led 
to a new stock market bubble rather than sustainable growth. Although US 
exports improved with the lower value of the dollar and lower energy costs 
from shale gas, the trade balance continued to be seriously off balance, and the 
US could not pay its debt. When attempts were made to reduce the printing of 
money, economic growth quickly slowed, so the printing was resumed again. 
This led to an economic crash in the US in November 2018. As the markets 
were no longer convinced by promises of quantitative easing, the crash was 
even worse than that in 2008 and the American dollar lost more than half its 
value. The Chinese lost one of their main export markets and the whole world 
economy fell two years in a row. Along with the world economy, oil and gas 
prices fell, undermining the development of the Barents Sea.
The EU
There was stagnation, continued high unemployment, debt, and increasing polit-
ical instability in some countries. Increasingly unruly member countries saw less 
and less benefit in the union and started challenging it – in particular Denmark, 
Hungary, and the UK. These developments led to a downward spiral, including 
another economic crisis, the rise of Euroskeptic parties (mostly right-wing, but, 
in a few places, left-wing), the weakening of environmental policy, and increased 
use of coal. For the Barents Sea this meant chaos and low demand in its main gas 
market, making it even more difficult to develop new gas fields.
Wild card 4: an energy technology revolution
There was a breakthrough in Canada in 2015 in the storage of CO
2
 from a 
coal-fired electricity plant, leading to a revival for coal. Electricity companies 
joined forces to develop a pipeline network for capturing and transporting CO
2
 
to suitable locations for storage, and managed to cut costs for the production of 
the necessary materials for the pipelines. This led to reduced investment in the oil 
and gas sector. Furthermore, in 2020 another energy technology breakthrough 
was achieved when Lockheed Martin finalized the technology for mass produc-
tion of mobile fusion reactors. The prospect of cheap and abundant electricity 
led to a substantial reduction in the development of new gas fields. For the Bar-
ents Sea, the effect was that all new field developments were put on hold and fur-
ther exploration drilling in the prospective Fedynsky High area was abandoned.
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Wild card 5: cooling of the Barents Sea
After a volcano eruption in Indonesia in 2018, a large cloud of volcano ash cov-
ered most of the earth’s atmosphere. The result was a global cooling that lasted 
for six years. During the cooling period the ice cover in the Arctic increased 
considerably, causing a setback in development work. The cooling also caused 
reduced temperatures worldwide, increasing the need for fuel for heating. For 
the Barents Sea projects, the situation resulted in an increased interest in Arc-
tic technology, with a delay, however, in exploration drilling and development 
studies due to the increased ice coverage.
Table 2.1  Overview of common assumptions for the three scenarios
Assumptions Scenario 1  
“After You, Sir”
Scenario 2  
“Parallel Play”
Scenario 3  
“Let’s Dance”
World markets vs. international 
political bodies
World markets and the geopolitical context will 
be more important than circumpolar or other 
international political bodies
Demand for energy Global energy demand is going to continue growing, 
driven by a combination of population growth and 
economic growth
Asian market growth Asian markets will continue to grow. Russia will 
continue diversifying its exports by expanding 
exports to the Asia–Pacific region
Global climate policy Climate change will remain on the political agenda
Barents petroleum exploration Large fields are not very likely to be found outside 
the potentially interesting structures that have 
already been identified for exploration, especially 
on the Norwegian side
Arctic petroleum production There will be significant interest in oil and gas 
production from the Arctic, but development 
will be dependent on the costs of operations, 
maintenance, and logistics. The cost of petroleum 
exploration and production will remain high in the 
Arctic, even if significant technological progress is 
made.
Arctic marine bio-resources The Barents Sea will remain a globally important 
marine habitat important for Arctic marine species 
and commercial fisheries
Arctic weather conditions Arctic weather conditions will continue to challenge 
personnel and hardware
The Northern Sea Route The Northern Sea Route will remain secondary as 
a transport route for oil and gas from the Barents 
Sea to Asia
Business-to-business 
cooperation
Oil companies will continue to want access to each 
other’s parts of the Barents Sea, but there will be 
limited room for small players, especially on the 
Russian side
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Table 2.2  Overview of uncertainties for the three scenarios
Uncertainty factors Scenario 1  
“After You, Sir”
Scenario 2  
“Parallel Play”
Scenario 3  
“Let’s Dance”
Future price of gas Low High High
Future price of oil Low High Low
Asian growth High High Low
Unconventionals outside US High Low Medium
Strict global climate policy Medium Lax Strict
Amount of oil found Medium Medium High
Amount of gas found High Medium Medium
Development of Lofoten area No Yes No
Arctic technology advancement Low Medium High
Norwegian–Russian relations Good Bad Good
Russian–Western relations Medium Bad Good
Extent of Russia’s orientation 
towards Asia
Yes Yes No
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